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L'Europa e la nuova "questione tedesca"

05/09/2011

Ulrike Guérot: Joschka Fischer, to begin right away with Jürgen Habermas' central idea: Is it true that Germany is once again staking an unabashed claim to leadership in a Europe that is increasingly shaped by Germany? Is this the trend of the age and are we therefore seeing a kind of renationalization of Germany, to the detriment of Europe?
Joschka Fischer: Jürgen Habermas' findings are impossible to disagree with, in the sense that the facts simply bear out his conclusions. But this "renationalization" does not express a conscious decision in the sense of a strategic U-turn, in the sense that on 9 November 1989 Germany made this great reversal back to the nation state. My impression is rather that, for several years now, this development is simply what is happening. Which, it must be said, does not improve the situation in the slightest. Of course the failure of the European constitutional treaty plays an important role in this, since the optimism connected with it has evaporated. I think the criticism of the treaty and its requirements as having been too ambitious is wrong, not least in view of what came next. It was not the oft-criticized ambition and emotionality of the European debate, particularly on the constitution, that led to failure; true cross-border democracy on a European scale could have done with this kind of emotion and engagement. That is the quintessence of the last few wasted years. The Lisbon treaty plainly cannot fill this emotional gap, for all its legal and administrative complexity.

What we experience today when we venture outside Europe is a fundamentally different global reality, which could not be in more marked contrast to the European one. If we look at China or the other BRIC states, or the reorientation of the USA, it's frankly laughable to imagine that even the "big three" in Europe – Great Britain and France, the two most powerful states, both nuclear powers and permanent members of the UN Security Council, along with Germany, the most powerful country economically and with the largest population – could on their own still play a globally significant role.
If we look at the economic facts and our mutual dependency, and the fact that the welfare state, the stability of our democratic system and the prosperity of the German population all require a large German national economy, it becomes simply ludicrous to continue to talk of a German domestic market. The interconnections in the European common market are much too close for that.
The euro is indeed coming under fire at the moment, but none of the professors vocally advocating a return to the deutschmark have said what the costs of doing so would be. And with good reason, since the costs would be huge and, believe it or now, the very country that has been the number one winner from the euro would become the chief loser. And guess which country we are talking about here? Yes – ours.
The facts all argue, especially from the German perspective, not only for pressing on with the process of European integration, but for pushing it to its conclusion. If we look at the effects of the EU's strategic weakness on its neighbouring countries, we see how the situation is stagnating and even threatening to reverse the progress that has been made – for instance in the Balkans, in Bosnia and other countries that are undoubtedly part of Europe, and no one disputes that the Balkans are part of Europe. And if we look further, we see how Turkey is moving further and further away from Europe and taking on an independent role; I wouldn't be surprised if Turkey were increasingly to take over the role of Europe in our immediate neighbourhood in the Mediterranean and also in the Middle East – not in economic terms, but politically. And when we consider the current security issues in the case of Libya – that is to say, the inability of the Europeans to reach a common policy on security and foreign affairs – then it becomes clear that in this country, even at the very top of government, it has not yet been understood that there can be no European foreign and security policy without unity among the "Big Three". Naive as I am, I thought that it was genetically inherited there should never again be a "two against one" conflict in Europe and that we should all act concertedly. But that's the very opposite of what we're seeing now.
And on top of that, Germany is now renouncing its leading role in the economic and particularly the currency crisis. This, although the Chancellor had just one decision to make: will she defend the euro or not? As the German Chancellor, her only option was to say yes. Any further hesitation was only going to be counterproductive. [...]

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